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the rule somewhat more broadly than most American cases would
justify. It reads in part as follows: "Where danger to others is likely
to attend the doing of a certain work, unless care is observed, the person
having it to do is under a duty to see that it is done with reasonable
care." In Warden v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 123 Ohio St. 305, 175
N.E. 207 (931), that syllabus was read to the jury, and they were
told to decide whether or not the work was dangerous. The instruction
was approved by the Supreme Court. The work being done was the
construction of a temporary trestle over a busy street, and the negligence
consisted in leaving a plank extending over the highway in such a posi-
tion that the plaintiff ran into it and was injured. The language used
above is similar to that in Section 297 of the Restatement: "One who
employs an independent contractor to do work which is inherently
dangerous to others is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them
by the contractor's failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm
resulting from the dangerous character of the work." The comment
and the explanatory notes, however, make it rather clear that the section
applies only to ultra-hazardous work or work involving the use of ultra-
hazardous instrumentalities, such as blasting, the use of fire in clearing
land, and the tearing down of high walls.
Unless we can say that the work of painting the sign was inher-
ently dangerous, it is submitted that none of the propositions stated in
the Restatement of the Law of Torts is broad enough to impose liability
in the principal case. Indeed, the negligence in the principal case would
probably be classed as collateral negligence. See comments and illustra-
tions in Sections 296 and 297. But the Reporter was careful to explain
that the American Law Institute did not intend to discourage further
extensions of liability. Tentative Draft No. 6, page 59.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
RIGHT OF FINDER AS AGAINST THmRD PERSON
Plaintiff, as an employee of the Toledo Trust Co. operated an elec-
tric door from a cage, admitting identified safety deposit customers,
employees who worked in the offices in the rear and on the second floor,
and visitors. In July, I92O, plaintiff found an unmarked envelope
containing five hundred dollars on the floor of the small lobby adjacent
to her cage. She reported it to the vice-president of the bank, who
placed the money in a special account. Upon a demand for the money
and a refusal, plaintiff sued in July, 1933. It was held that the judg-
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ment for the plaintiff was not barred by the statute of limitations on
grounds; (i) a continuing trust is exempt from its operation, Ohio Gen.
Code Sec. II, 236 and; (2) it does not begin to run until demand and
refusal, Ohio Gen. Code Sec. I 1, 224. The judgment was affirmed on
appeal. Toledo Trust Co. v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373 (Oct. 7,
1935).
Where property has been left on a desk or table in a quasi-public
place or private premises, courts in both the United States and England
will hold for the owner of the premises as against a finder on the theory
of custody. State v. Courtsol, 89 Conn. 564, 94 AUt. 973 (1915);
Foster v. Fidelity Safe Detosit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376
(915); Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139 (1867); Heddle v. Bank of
Hamilton, 17 B.C. 3o6, 6 B.R.C. 256 (I9I2); Loucks v. Gallogly,
23 N.Y. Supp. 126 (1892); Aigler, Rights of Finders, 21 Mich. L.
Rev. 664, 57 Am. L. Rev. 51I; Mcilvoy v. Medina, ii Allen 548,
87 Am. Dec. 733 (1866).
If the circumstances are such as to justify classifying an article as
lost, the United States courts will hold the finder entitled to retain the
property, whether found on a quasi-public or private premises. Cleve-
land]R. Co. v. Durschuk, 31 Ohio App. 248, 166 N.E. 909 (1928);
Hoagland v. Forest Park Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 70 S.W. 878
(1902); Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281, 3o Am. Rep. 172 (878);
Matthews v. Harsell, I E. D. Smith (N.Y.) 393 (1852); Tatum v.
Sharpless, 6 Phila. i8 (x865); Hamaker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377, 35
Am. Rep. 664 (1879); Thayer on Possession, 18 Harv. L.R. 196.
The English courts, however, are unwilling to draw the distinction be-
tween "lost" and "left" property when the lost article is found on a pri-
vate place. The theory is that the owner of the locus in quo is entitled to
all property attached to or under the land. South Staffordshire Water Co.
v. Sharman, 2 Q.B. 44 (1896); Pollock and Wright, Essay on Posses-
sion in the Common Law, 41; Shartel, Meaning of Possession, 16 Minn.
L. Rev. 61 I; Holmes, Possession in the Common Law, 2o6; Bridges
v. Hawkesworth, 21 L. J. Q. B. (N.S.) 75 (185) •
Cases involving the finding of articles on the premises of safety
deposit companies are few. In one case, by the extension of the custody
theory, the arbitrary distinction between "lost" and "left" property was
considered immaterial, and the safety deposit company held to be
entitled to the bond found on the floor of a private room maintained for
box-renters exclusively. Silicott v. Louisville Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234,
265 S.W. 6 12 ( 1924). In the principal case the court refused to reject
the distinction, but its conclusion may be justified on the ground that
the money was found in the lobby of a semi-public place.
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Due primarily to the nature of the business, it is a question of policy
for the courts to decide, whether they will extend the custody theory,
to cover property lost anywhere on the premises of a safety deposit
company. WILLIAM CREME.
SALES
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FOOD SOLD IN A RESTAURANT - SALE
OR SERVICE - JOINDER OF ACTIONS
The plaintiff's husband purchased a sandwich in defendant's restau-
rant, ate it and died of ptomaine poisoning caused by it. Notice of the
death was given by plaintiff after her appointment as administratrix.
The petition contained counts based upon negligence and implied war-
ranty of fitness of food for human consumption. Recovery was had
on the latter count, no negligence having been proved. Schuler v.
Union News Co., (Mass. 1936), 4 N.E. (2d) 465.
In the early law, an innkeeper was not liable for food served a
patron on theory of implied warranty, but he was liable for negligence
in its preparation. Beale, Innkeepers, Sec. 169; Keilway, 91; I Willis-
ton on "Sales" (2d Ed.) Sec. 242b. A majority of the courts of last
resort still refuse to hold hotels and restaurants liable upon an implied
warranty of food sold for human consumption. Meriill v. Hodson,
88 Conn 314, 9 Ad. 533 (I914); Rickner v. Ritz Restaurant, 13
N. J. Mis., 818, 181 Atl. 398 (1935); Nisky v. Child's Co., 103
N.J.L. 464, 135 Ad. 805 (1927); Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed.
519 (1914); Rowe v. Louisville N.R. Co., 29 Ga. App. 151, 113
S.E. 823 (1922); Travis v. Louisville R. Co., 183 Ala. 415, 62 So.
851 (1913); Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 l. 518, 45 N.E. 253
(1896); Burkhardt v. Arnion Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 At. 385
(1932). "The question is supposed to depend on whether the restaurant
keeper made a 'sale' to the customer of the injurious food." I Willis-
ton on "Sales" (2d Ed.) Sec. 2426. If it is a sale it comes within Sec.
15 (I) of the Uniform Sales Act and there is an implied warranty.
Heise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. 551, 149 N.E. 182 (1925); Smith v.
Carlos, 215 Mo. App. 488, 247 S.W. 468 (1923); Barrington v.
Hotel Astor, 184 N.Y. App. 317, 171 N.Y.S. 840 (1919); West v.
Katspanas, 107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 Ad. 685 (1932); Goetten v.
Owl Drug Co., 49 Pac. (2d) 286 (1935); Smith v. Geerish, 256
Mass. 183, 152 N.E. 318 (1926). But if it is not a sale then it is a
rendition of service and there is no implied warranty. The courts which
refuse to imply a warranty do so on the theory that restaurants render
